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AMERICAN ACCEPTANCE OF
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
The doctrine of charitable trusts is not an Anglo-American
innovation. It was developed by the Romans,1 and introduced
into England through the ecclesiastics.' Despite its ecclesias-
tical introduction, the English law of charity was not shaped
merely by religious or moral concepts. The idea of utility to
the public was recognized, and it was accepted that "There is,
indeed, but a slight difference in the eye of reason between
such property as is devoted to charity and that which is
given to ordinary public uses." ' To a society developing com-
mercially during the Middle Ages, the growth and security of
trade and travel were essential.4 There was thus a need felt
for transportation facilities. Gifts for the construction of
roads and the repair of bridges and highways were early
recognized as valid charitable uses.5
In the Middle Ages it was popularly believed that the
donation of property to charity was an effective means of
saving the soul and expiating sin.' Many persons, on their
death beds, in the hopes of attaining salvation, gave property
to religious uses. The church thus came to own great quanti-
ties of land which was held in frankalmoigne tenure.' The
overlord and the king thereby lost their expectation of es-
cheat and various other rights and incidents of military
tenure.8 To avoid this result several statutes were enacted
providing that "lands" held by religious bodies should be
1 Church of Jesus Christ v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 792, 806, 34 L.
Ed. 478 (1890).
2 Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N.Y. (7 Tiff.) 584, 601 (1866). See also Willard,
Illustration of the Origin of Cy Pres, 8 HARv. L. REv. 69, 72 (1894).
3 DWIGHT, ARGUMENT IN COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK n THE RosE WiLL
CASE 66 (1863), as quoted in, Willard, supra note 2, at 71.
4 Willard, supra note 2, at 71.
5 The bridge at Witham is inscribed, "And the blessid besines is brigges to
make." Willard, supra note 2, at 71 n. 4.
6 FiscH, CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 4-5 (1950).
7 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 348.2 (1939).
8 Hubbard v. Worcester Art Museum, 194 Mass. 280, 80 N.E. 490, 491 (1907).
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forfeited to the overlord; and if he failed to enter, then to
his overlord, and finally to the crown."' These remedial
efforts culminated in the suppression of monasteries during
the reign of Henry VIII."°
The disherision of the heirs of the donor often resulted
from these desperate death-bed grasps at salvation. And
again, statutes were enacted to prevent this evil. Thus, the
act of 9 Geo. II, c. 36 (1736), commonly called "The Mort-
main Act," was enacted for the purpose of preventing "im-
provident alienations or disposition made by languishing or
dying persons, or by other persons, to uses called charitable
uses, to take place after their deaths, to the disherision of
their lawful heirs ... ," " Under this act such uses were
absolutely void.
9 3 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 7. See also 1 BL. CoMM. 1079-80 n. 7 (Jones ed.
1915).
10 Bradway, Tendencies in the Application oj the Cy-Pres Doctrine, 5 TarP.
L.Q. 489, 491 (1931).
11 Statutes preventing the death-bed disherision of heirs in favor of charities
have their present day counterparts in the laws of several states. N.Y. DECEDENT
ESTATE LAW § 17 provides: "No person having a husband, wife, child, or descendent
or parent, shall, by his or her last will and testament, devise or bequeath to any
benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific, religious or missionary society, associa-
tion, corporation or purpose, in trust or otherwise, more than one-half part of his
or her estate, after the payment of his or her debts, and such devise or bequest
shall be valid to the extent of one-half, and no more." See also CAL. PROS. CODE
ANx. §§ 41-2 (Deering Supp. 1951) ; FLA. STAT. §731.19 (1951).
The enactment 'f constitutional provisions against the establishment of testa-
mentary devises of land, and inter vivos gifts of personalty (now repealed) in Mis-
sissippi was explained in Blackbourn v. Tucker, 72 Miss. 735, 17 So. 737 (1895) as an
attempt to prevent the donor from disinheriting his wife and children by giving all
of his property to religious uses. Unwillingness to sustain charitable trusts by virtue
of the cy pres doctrine on the ground that it would result in the disherision of heirs
is still found in present day decisions. Brooks v. Belfast, 90 Me. 318, 38 At. 222, 227
(1897), as quoted in, First Universalist Soc. of Bath v. Swett ...-Me ...... 90 A (2d)
812, 817 (1952): "It is not the duty of the court to be 'curious and subtle' in devis-
ing schemes to aid testators in disinheriting their next of kin ..... ." In Doughten v.
Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51, 77 (1875), the court, in upholding a charitable bequest,
stated: "I am aware that I have in this opinion gone quite far enough in the appli-
cation of well-recognized equitable principles to charitable uses. It would not have
been a matter of regret to me if I had been able to arrive at different conclusions.
There is nothing in the will of Amy Doughten, with respect to these charitable be-
quests, at the expense of her relatives in blood, that meets with the approval of my
judgment. Her example in this respect I would not commend as worthy of imita-
tion; and nothing but a sense of duty, which compels me to follow the law as
expounded by courts of equity, has caused me to give an interpretation to the pro-
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
Although various statutes had been aimed at the suppres-
sion of monasteries and also hospitals and colleges, 2 the
utility of charitable organizations for political purposes was
recognized by Edward VI. A primary purpose of his reign
was to promote the Reformation by every possible means,
and the establishment of schools was considered an effective
method for the accomplishment of this end. Accordingly,
many schools were founded by the king and by other persons
with wealth who were encouraged to devote their fortunes
to the same cause." Queen Elizabeth I also encouraged the
founding oi -..Aools in order to spread political ideologies;
and in addition, she gave relief to the poor and generally
extended the limits of charity. 4 But, in common with other
English monarchs who had preceeded her, Elizabeth I was
faced with the problem of abuses in connection with charit-
able institutions: abuses resulting from the fact that the
internal organization of permanent institutions, such as col-
leges, and hospitals for the relief of the sick and the indigent,
were subject only to the control of the visitor. 5 The visitor-
ial power is the right of the founder to see that the institution
fulfills the purposes for which it was created. As these powers
were only sporadically exercised, many abuses in the man-
agement of charitable institutions and the application of
their funds resulted. 6
To correct these abuses, in 1601 the Statute of Charitable
Uses was enacted." The statute entitled, "An act to redress
visions of her will and the codicil thereto by which her heirs at law are excluded
from the benefit of sharing her estate."
12 3 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 7.
13 BOYLE, CHARITIEs 4 (1837).
14 Id. at 8.
15 TuDoR, CHARMTES AND MORTMAIN 2 (4th ed. 1906).
16 Ibid.
'7 Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eaz., c. 4. The preamble states that many
hospitals wcre decayed and the goods and profits misemployed. The act then pro-
vides for the reformation of these abuses. It is interesting to note that the statute
contains the following words: "founded ... in aid and merit of the souls of the said
founders."
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the mis-employment of lands, goods and stocks of money
heretofore given to certain charitable uses," recited as fol-
lows: 18
Whereas lands, tenements, rents, annuities, profits, heredita-
ments, goods, chattels, money and stocks of money,'have been
heretofore .. assigned, as well by the Queen's most excellent
Majesty, and her most noble progenitors, as by sundry other
well-disposed persons: some for relief of aged, impotent and
poor people, some for maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers
and mariners, schools of learning, free schools, and scholars
in universities, some for repair of bridges, ports, havens,
causeways, churches, sea-banks and highways, some for educa-
tion and preferment of orphans, some for or towards relief,
stock or maintenance for houses of correction, some for mar-
riages of poor maids, some for supportation, aid and help of
young tradesmen, handicraftsmen..., and others for relief or
redemption of prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of any
poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, setting out
of soldiers and other taxes; which lands, tenements ... never-
theless have not been employed according to the charitable
intent of the givers and founders thereof, by reason of frauds,
breaches of trust, and negligence in those that should pay,
deliver and employ the same: for redress and remedy where-
of....
The remedial portions of the statute gave the chancellor
the power to inquire into breaches of and enforce charitable
trusts by special commission, while preserving the already
existing remedy afforded by the Chancery court. 9
Repeal of the Statute of Charitable Uses
After the American revolution, many of our states experi-
enced a feeling of great revulsion to laws of English deriva-
tion, and a wholesale repeal of statutes was instituted."0
Typical of these was the statute enacted by the General As-
sembly of Virginia in 1792 which provided that "no . . .
statute or act of parliament shall have any force or authority
18 SCOTT, CASES ON TRUSTS 572-3 (4th ed. 1951).
19 3 SCOTT, op cit. supra note 7. The remedial parts of the statute were repealed
by the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888, 51 & 52 VicT., c. 42, § 13.
20 See notes 21, 22, 23 infra.
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
within the commonwealth.""' The Statute of Charitable
Uses, being an English statute, thus fell victim to the axe of
the legislator. In New York22 and Michigan23 the repeal of
the Statute of Charitable Uses sounded the death knell of
charitable trusts of personalty.
The New York Court of Appeals in 1853, in the leading
case of Williams v. Williams,24 upheld the validity of a be-
quest in trust for the education of the children of the poor,
on the ground that the law of charitable uses had not stem-
med from the statute of Elizabeth but "was at an indefinite
but early period in English judicial history, engrafted
upon the common law. 25 Subsequent decisions, however,
repeatedly attacked the Williams case,26 and its scope was
narrowed until it was virtually impossible to formulate a
charitable trust of personalty that would be held valid."
Some of the latter decisions were based on the contention
that by the repeal of the Statute of Charitable Uses, the
legislature intended to abrogate the entire law of charitable
trusts, for in 1788 it was generally thought that all charitable
trusts depended on this statute for their enforceability.28 It
21 1 VA. REv. CODE C. 40, § 3 (1819). This statute repealed that part of the
ordinance of 1776 which related to any English statute. The ordinance of 1776
adopted as the law of Virginia the common and general statute law which was in
force in England prior to 4 JAMES I.
22 By the N.Y. Laws 1786, c. 35, a commission was appointed to collate the
English statutes in force in that state "to the intent that when the same shall have
been completed, then and from thenceforth, none of the statutes of England or of
Great Britain, shall operate or be considered as laws of this state." The Statute of
Charitable Uses was then repealed by N.Y. Laws 1788, c. 46, § 37.
23 Michigan, in 1810, enacted a statute which provided ". . that no act of the
parliament of England, and no act of the parliament of Great Britain shall have any
force within the territory of Michigan." 1 TERRTORIAL LAws OF MICHIGANr 900
(1810).
24 8 N.Y. (4 Seld.) 525 (1853).
25 Id. at 542.
26 Owens v. The Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 14 N.Y.
(4 Kernan) 380 (1856); Beekman v. New York, 27 Barb. 260 (N.Y. 1858), afI'd,
Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N.Y. (9 Smith) 298 (1861); Dodge v. Pond, 23 N.Y. (9
Smith) 69 (1861), affirming, Phelps v. Phelps, 28 Barb. 121 (N.Y. 1858); Downing
v. Marshall, 23 N.Y. (9 Smith) 366 (1861); Prichard v. Thompson, 95 N.Y. (50
Sick.) 76 (1884); Holland v. Allcock, 108 N.Y. (63 Sick.) 312, 16 N.E. 305 (1888).
27 ZoLLmANN, AmmuCAc LAW OF CHAI-n.rs 33 (1924).
28 Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N.Y. (7 Tiff.) 584 (1866); Levy v. Levy, 33 N.Y. (6
Tiff.) 97 (1865).
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was also felt that charitable uses were frequently abused and
should be prohibited. Thus the court in Bascom v. Albertson
stated: 20
... it seems to have been assumed in the Williams case, that
the purpose of the legislature of 1788 was to reinaugurate here
an ancient and obsolete system, freed from all the salutary
restraints of modern English legislation; or, perhaps more
properly, that the members of that enlightened body, through
heedless incaution, circumvented their own intent, and ex-
humed to new life in a free State the buried abuses of the old
English Court of Chancery, by repealing the Mortmain Acts
and the statute of Elizabeth, which had shorn that court of the
unlimited powers it had usurped from time to time, in periods
of sectarian strife and of intestine and foreign wars.
The court also said: 30
By this inchoate act of the State government a new policy
was inaugurated. It was not merely the rescission of certain
British statutes. It was the abrogation of a system which had
been tried and condemned. It was not the revival of a more
ancient and odious system, but a casting off of the English law
of charitable uses, as an unseemly outgrowth of ecclesiastic
innovation and abuse.
With the passage of the Tilden Act "' in 1893, charitable
trusts were established in New York.
The Michigan court followed the reasoning of the later
New York cases and outlawed charitable trusts of personal
property in Hopkins v. Crossley,32 on the ground that the
repeal of the statute of Elizabeth had abolished the entire
law of charities.3
29 34 N.Y. (7 Tiff.) 584, 614 (1866).
30 Id. at 605-6.
3' N.Y. Laws 1893, c. 701. "An act to regulate gifts for charitable purposes.
Section 1. No gift, grant, bequest, or devise to religious, educational, charitable or
benevolent uses, which shall, in other respects, be valid under the laws of this State,
shall be deemed invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons
designated as the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument creating the same. If in
the instrument creating such a gift, grant, bequest or devise there is a trustee named
to execute the same, the legal title to the lands or property given, granted, devised
or bequeathed for such purposes shall vest in such trustee. If no person be named as
trustee then the title to such lands or property shall vest in the supreme court."
32 132 Mich. 612, 96 N.W. 499 (1903).
33 See note 23 supra.
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Unlike New York and Michigan, the repeal of the Statute
of Charitable Uses would not have proved disastrous to
charitable trusts in Virginia,34 Maryland,35 West Virginia36
and the District of Columbia." Only as a result of a mis-
construction of the statute by the Supreme Court of the
United States,38 did its repeal become the instrument that
outlawed charitable trusts in these states.
In 1819 the Supreme Court of the United States was
called upon to decide the case of Trustees of the Philadelphia
Baptist. Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs,39 where a Virginia testator be-
queathed a gift to a society for the purpose of educating
Baptist youths for the ministry. Virginia had repealed all
English statutes, including the Statute of Charitable Uses,
prior to the death of the testator, and the question before
the Court was the validity of the bequest. Erroneously find-
ing that the English equity courts had no inherent jurisdic-
tion to sustain charitable trusts, jurisdiction being derived
only from the Statute of Charitable Uses, Chief Justice Mar-
shall held the gift invalid. American equity courts, having
the same jurisdiction as the English equity courts, were thus
unable to enforce charitable trusts."
Three years after the Baptist decision, the Maryland judi-
ciary in deciding the case of Dashiell v. Attorney General,41
34 See note 21 supra for repeal of Statute of Charitable Uses in Virginia.
35 The Statute of Charitable Uses was found unsuited for local needs in Mary-
land by virtue of Kilty's Report. See Dashiell v. Attorney-General, 9 Md. 392, 403,
5 Harris & J.320 (1822).
36 When West Virginia separated from virginia and became a state, it retained
Virginia law and Virginia had repealed the Statute of Charitable Uses. See note 21
supra.
37 The District of Columbia was regulated by the laws of Virginia and Maryland
until 1846 when Maryland laws alone 'were the governing authority. See note 35
supra.
38 Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 4 Wheat. 1, 4 L.
Ed. 499 (U.S. 1819).
39 Ibid.
40 Blackwell, The Charitable Corporation and the Charitable Trust, 24 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1 (1938).
41 9 Md. 392, 5 Harris & J. 320 (1822). The reasoning of this case was followed
in: American Colonization Soc. v. Soulsby, 129 Md. 605, 99 At. 944 (1917); Mis-
sionary Soc. of Methodist Episcopal Church v. Humphreys, 91 Md. 131, 46 Ati. 320
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embedded the error of the Supreme Court into its law and
over one hundred years of effort by the legislature was need-
ed to correct the result of that decision." The District of
Columbia adopted the error five years later in Barnes' Heirs
v. Barnes,43 the court stating that "The peculiar doctrines of
the English law in regard to charitable devises, are founded
altogether upon that statute [Statute of Charitable Uses] ." 44
Virginia, in 1832, followed the view of the Baptist case,45
thereby reversing its earlier decisions upholding the validity
of charitable trusts.46 After the decision in Gallego's Ex'rs v.
The Attorney General,47 several attempts were made both by
the courts48 and the legislatures 49 of Virginia to validate
charitable trusts, but this result was not fully achieved until
1914 when the Assembly enacted the following statute: 50
(1900); Maught v. Getzendanner, 65 Md. 527, 5 Atl. 471 (1886); Isaacs v. Emory,
64 Md. 333, 1 Atl. 713 (1885); Church Extension of the Methodist Episcopal
Church v. Smith, 56 Md. 362, 397 (1881); Needles v. Martin, 33 Md. 609 (1871);
Wilderman v. Mayor of Baltimore, 8 Md. 551 (1855).
42 Charitable trusts were completely recognized by Md. Laws 1931, c. 453. For
prior statutes partially validating charitable trusts see MD. ComP. LAws §§ 13512-
13521 (1929).
43 2 Fed. Cas. 855, No. 1,014 (C.C.D.C. 1827). This was followed by Coltman
v. Moore, 1 MacArth. 197 (D.C. 1873). The error was corrected in Ould v. Wash-
ington Hospital for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 24 L. Ed. 450 (1877).
44 2 Fed. Cas. No. 1,014, at 858 (C.C.D.C. 1827).
45 Gallego's Ex'rs v. Attorney General, 3 Leigh 450 (Va. 1832). For subsequent
cases adopting this point of view see: Jordan v. Universalist General Convention
Trustees, 107 Va. 79, 57 S.E. 652 (1907) ; Fifield v. Van Wyck's Ex'r, 94 Va. 557,
27 S.E. 446 (1897) ; Seaburn's Ex'r v. Seaburn, 15 Gratt. 423 (Va. 1859) ; Literary
Fund v. Dawson, 10 Leigh 147 (Va. 1839).
46 Overseers of the Poor v. Tayloe's Adm'r, 1 Gilm. 336 (Va. 1821); President
and Professors of William and Mary College v. Hodgson, 6 Munf. 163 (Va. 1818);
see also, 2 Va. Col. Dec. B. 363 (1743).
47 3 Leigh 450 (Va. 1832).
48 Trustees of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church v. Guthrie, 86
Va. 125, 10 S.E. 318 (1889); P. Episcopal E. Society v. Churchman's Reps., 80 Va.
(5 Hansb.) 718 (1885) (charitable trust valid on ground that equity has inherent
power to enforce charitable trusts).
49 Acts of Assembly 1839, c. 12; Acts of Assembly 1840, c. 26, VA. CODE c. 80,
§§ 2 et. seq. (1849) (validated devises and bequests made to educational institutions
other than theological seminaries) ; Acts of Assembly 1841, c. 102, VA. CODE c. 77,
§§ 8-13 (1850) (partially validated trust for religious purposes) ; Acts of Assembly
1847, c. 105, VA. CODE C. 77, §§ 14-15 (1849) (validated trusts for benevolent asso-
ciation); VA. CODE C. 80, § 2 (1860) (partially validated devises and bequests for
literary purposes).
50 Acts of Assembly 1914, c. 234, p. 414, VA. CODE ANN. § 55-26 (1950).
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
. . . every gift, grant, devise or bequest made hereafter for
charitable purposes, whether made in any case to a body
corporate or unincorporated, or to a natural person, shall be as
valid as if made to or for the benefit of a certain natural person.
. . . Nothing in this section shall be so construed as to give
validity to any devise or bequest to or for the use of any un-
corporated theological seminary.
Although the Supreme Court in 1844 finally overruled
the Baptist case, West Virginia, when first called upon to
decide the validity of a charitable trust in 1873, endorsed the
incorrect theory enunciated in the Baptist case.52
Codification of the Law of Trusts
The judicial interpretation of the codification of the New
York law of trusts was another factor that retarded the ac-
ceptance of charitable trusts. In 1829 the New York legisla-
ture revised the law, and in so doing abolished all uses and
trusts in land except as expressly authorized.53 The four pur-
poses sanctioned were: "
1. to sell lands for the benefit of creditors;
2. to sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefit of legatees,
or for the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon;
3. to receive the rents and profits of lands, and apply them
to the education and support, or either, of any person, during
the life of such person, or for any shorter term, subject to the
rules prescribed in the first Article of this title;
4. to reserve the rents and profits of lands, and to accumu-
late the same, for the purposes and within the limits prescribed
in the first Article of this title.
No express provision was made for charitable trusts. When
the question first arose in Shotwell v. Mott,55 whether charit-
51 Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 127, 11 L. Ed. 205 (U.S. 1844).
52 Bible Society v. Pendleton, 7 W. Va. 79 (1873). For cases following see:
Ritter v. Couch, 71 W. Va. 221, 76 S.E. 428 (1912); Weaver v. Spurr, 56 W. Va.
95, 48 S.E. 852 (1904); Pack v. Shanklin, 43 W. Va. 304, 27 S.E. 389 (1897); Wil-
son v. Perry, 29 W. Va. 169, 1 S.E. 302 (1886) ; Knox v. Knox's Ex'rs, 9 W. Va. 124
(1876). Beginning with 1868 the legislature enacted a series of statutes designed to
validate charitable trusts. W. VA. CODE c. 57, § 7 (1868); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3502
(1949). See also, Charitable Trusts of a Religious Nature in West Virginia, 34 W.
VA. L.Q. 302 (1928).
53 1 N.Y. REv. STAT. § 45 (1829).
54 1 N.Y. REV. STAT. § 55 (1829).
55 2 Sandf. Ch. 46, 56 (N.Y. 1844).
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able trusts of land were by exclusion abolished, the court
held that the revisers were dealing solely with private trusts
and did not intend the statute to relate to charitable trusts.
Subsequent cases, however, failed to adhere to this interpreta-
tion56 and the Shotwell decision was labeled unsound " and
finally overruled.58
Michigan, in 1846, copied the New York revised statute
dealing with trusts in land, 9 and also adopted the New York
interpretation of this statute. ° Three years later Wisconsin
incorporated this statute into its laws, 61 and in Ruth v. Ober-
brunner,62 committed itself to the New York and Michigan
position.
While Minnesota was a territory, it was subject to those
Wisconsin laws which had been in force when Wisconsin
became a state.63 When Minnesota established it own code
in 1851, it retained the Wisconsin statute dealing with trusts
of land,64 and following the lead of the other three states, re-
fused to uphold charitable trusts of realty.65
Perhaps the underlying rationale of the effect given to the
New York statute dealing with trusts in land can be found
56 Yates v. Yates, 9 Barb. 324 (N.Y. 1850); Ayers v. The Methodist Church, 3
Sandf. 351 (N.Y. 1849).
57 Voorhees v. The Presbyterian Church of Amsterdam, 17 Barb. 103 (N.Y.
1853).
58 Holmes v. Mead, 52 N.Y. (7 Sick.) 332 (1873).
59 MicH. REv. STAT. c. 63 (1846).
60 Trustees of the First Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark
v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730,3 N.W. 207 (1879).
61 WIs. REV. STAT. C. 57 (1849).
62 40 Wis. 238 (1876). To remedy the results of this decision, the statute author-
izing permissible trusts, Wis. REV. STAT. § 2081 (5) (1878), was amended by adding
the following permissible purpose: ". . . real estate given, granted or devised to
literary or charitable corporations which shall have been organized under the laws
of this state for their sole use and benefit." It will be noted, however, that trusts,
not in the corporate form, were not authorized until 1917. Wis. STAT. § 2081 (7)
(1917).
63 9 STAT. 403, 40 7 (1849).
64 MiNN. REV. STAT. c. 44 (1851).
65 Little v. Willford, 31 Minn. 173, 17 N.W. 282 (1883). This was followed by
In re Shanahan's Estate, 88 Minn. 202, 92 N.W. 948 (1903); Lane v. Eaton, 69
Minn. 141, 71 N.W. 1031 (1897). An amendment to the statute permitting trusts by
the addition of certain trusts of personalty, was held in the Shanahan case to bjing
all trusts, both of realty and personalty within the statute.
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
in an inherent and basic dislike by our courts of the doctrine
of charitable uses. Thus, in Watkins v. Bigelow,66 the court,
in holding unconstitutional a statute that attempted to estab-
lish charitable trusts, declared: 67
No legislator, lawyer, or layman, by reading the title, would
understand, or even suspect, that the purpose of the act was to
effect a practical repeal of the existing statutes prohibiting
express trusts by authorizing the creation of trusts for nearly
every conceivable purpose; to change the settled public policy
of the state on the subject of trusts, as indicated by its statutes
and the decisions of its courts for 50 years; to open wide the
door for abuses which the original statute was intended to
remedy; to permit an evasion of our laws against perpetuities
and accumulation by the creation of trusts; to abrogate the
rule requiring the beneficiaries to be certain, or capable of
being rendered certain; and to establish the ancient and dis-
carded rule of charitable uses, and to invest the courts with the
prerogative power of cy pres in its most obnoxious form. Such
is the legal effect of the statute in question.
Misinterpretation of Charitable, Trust Doctrines
The misinterpretation of the scope of the doctrine of char-
itable trusts, plus confusion as to the nature of the cy pres
doctrine were also instrumental in retarding the development
of charitable trusts. The cy pres doctrine is a trust device
used to effect a new application of purpose where it is im-
possible to carry out the specific charitable intention of the
donor.6" In England the cy pres power was of two kinds,
judicial and prerogative." The chancellor exercised the judi-
cial cy pres under his jurisdiction as an equity judge and the
prerogative cy pres as the representative of the king." Amer-
ican courts, with their great aversion to anything relating to
66 93 Minn. 210, 100 N.W. 1104 (1904).
67 Id., 100 N.W. at 1109.
68 RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 399 (1935): "If property is given in trust to be
applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or im-
practicable or illegal to carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor mani-
fested a more general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the
trust wil not fail but the court will direct the application of the property to some
charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor."
69 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 432 (1953).
70 2 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 718 (7th ed. 1929).
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the prerogative of the English sovereign," failed to take
cognizance of the existence of the judicial cy pres power, and
abolished the entire doctrine as one of prerogative72 and,
therefore, dangerous and contrary to our American institu-
tions.73
Our courts made the further error of confusing the doctrine
of charitable trusts with the doctrine of cy pres. Thus Pom-
eroy found it necessary to advise that: "
The true doctrine of cy pres should not be confounded, as is
sometimes done, with the more general principle which leads
courts of equity to sustain and enforce charitable gifts, where
the trustee, object, and beneficiaries are simply uncertain.
There is a radical distinction between the two....
In those states which rejected the cy pres doctrine and mis-
understood the principle of charitable trusts, many charitable
71 White v. Fisk, 22 Conn. 31 (1852); Cromie's Heirs v. Louisville Orphans'
Home Society, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 365, 375 (1867); Watkins v. Gigelow, 93 Minn.
210, 100 N.W. 1104 (1904); Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N.Y. (7 Tiff.) 584 (1866);
Holland v. Peck, 37 N.C. 255,2 Ired. Eq. 187 (1842).
72 Lovelace v. Marion Institute, 215 Ala. 271, 110 So. 381 (1926); Universalist
Convention of Alabama v. May, 147 Ala. 455, 41 So. 515 (1906): "... the theory
upon which the bill is filed finds no support in the former adjudications on the sub-
ject by this court. The doctrine of cy pres, as recognized . . . by the English Court
of Chancery, was based upon prerogative power of the king, and the principle,
therefore, is by us, under our institutions, without recognition." Woodroof v. Hund-
ley, 147 Ala. 287, 39 So. 907 (1905); Williams v. Pearson, 38 Ala. 299 (1862);
Doughten v. Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51, 64 (1875): "The principle or doctrine of the
exercise of this ministerial function of the English chancellor was what is known as
cy pres; that is to say, where there was a definite charitable purpose which could
not take place, the court would substitute another, and formerly of a very different
character. It was not, however, in the exercise of the judicial function of his office,
but in the exercise of his ministerial function, that the English chancellor applied
the fund to a different purpose from that contemplated by the testator, provided
it was charitable." Johnson v. Johnson, 92 Tenn. 559, 23 S.W. 114, 116 (1893):
"The doctrine of parens patriae and cy pres, as recognized in the English law, have
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44 N.W. 304, 305 (1890): the doctrine of cy pres was not used because it "rested
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73 Grimes' Ex'rs v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198 (1871); Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N.Y.
(7 Tiff.) 584, 613 (1866) ; Bridges v. Pleasants, 39 N.C. 26, 4 Ired. Eq. 20 (1845) ;
Methodist Church v. Remington, 1 Watt. 218, 226 (Pa. 1832): the principle of cy
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74 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1027 (5th ed. 1941).
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
gifts became unenforceable. 5 An early example of such a
result is found in White v. Fisk,76 decided in 1852. One of the
issues involved was the validity of a trust "for the support
of indigent pious young men, preparing for the ministry, in
New Haven, Conn." " The court, instead of recognizing this
gift as a valid charitable trust, sustainable by the inherent
power of equity, held that it could be validated only by an
application of the cy pres doctrine: 78
There may be other cases in this country, and there certainly
are many in England, in which charities, more equivocal and
uncertain than the one we are considering, have been sustain-
ed; but we are persuaded that this has been done either
avowedly, or under the influence of the principle of cy pres.
As Connecticut had rejected the cy pres doctrine as one of
prerogative, the gift was not enforced."
The reasoning of this case has been followed through the
years by various courts,"0 and as recently as 1938, an Idaho
court held a trust "for any and all such charitable or religious
purposes as my said trustee may elect.. . ," invalid for failure
to designate a beneficiary.8 ' The decision was based on the
following incorrect ground: 82
In England, and in some of the states of this country, a rule
has been established, in the interest of trusts for public charit-
75 Lepage v. McNamara, 5 Iowa 124, (1857); Dashiell v. Attorney-General, 9
Md. 392, 5 Harris & J. 320 (1822); Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N.Y. (9 Smith) 298
(1861); Bridges v. Pleasants, 39 N.C. 26, 4 Ired. Eq. 20 (1845); Holland v. Peck,
37 N.C. 255, 2 Ired. Eq. 187 (1842); Davis v. Bullington, 164 Tenn. 272, 47 S.W.
(2d) 555 (1932); Green v. Allen, 5 Humph. 169 (Tenn. 1844); Massanetta Springs
v. Keezell, 161 Va. 532, 171 S.E. 511 (1933); Beatty v. Union Trust & Deposit Co.,
123 W. Va. 144, 13 S.E.(2d) 760 (1941); Tharp v. Smith, 182 Wis. 107, 195 N.W.
331 (1923); Heiss, Ex'r v. Murphey, 40 Wis. 276 (1876).
76 22 Conn. 31 (1852).
77 Id. at 34.
78 Id. at 54.
79 Ibid. The doctrine was described as "inconsistent with the limited and defined
powers of the judiciary, as understood and approved in this state."
80 Crim v. Williamson, 180 Ala. 179, 60 So. 293 (1912); Ingraham v. Sutherland,
89 Ark. 596, 117 S.W. 748 (1909); Robbins v. Hoover, 50 Colo. 610, 115 Pac. 526
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able uses, whereby they will be upheld although the beneficiary
is not designated. Trusts so upheld are dependent upon the
English doctrine of cy pres, whereby the king, or the chan-
cellor as the keeper of the king's conscience, has the power,
acting ministerially as distinguished from judicially, to desig-
nate the beneficiary of a trust for charitable uses, where one
has not been designated by the donor or where, for any cause,
the trust would fail without such ministerial action. Here, we
have no king and, in this state, we have no court with such
ministerial power.
There can be no doubt that this trust could have been upheld
by the ordinary power of an equity court to sustain charit-
able trusts, and that the cy pres doctrine had no application
in this situation. 3
Conclusion
The acceptance of charitable trusts was greatly impeded
by three factors: (1) the misinterpretation and repeal of the
Statute of Charitable Uses, (2) the codification of the New
York law of trusts and (3) confusion as to the scope of the
power of equity courts to uphold charitable trusts, and a
misunderstanding as to the nature of the cy pres doctrine.
Underlying all these factors, however, and to some extent the
motivating cause for decisions antagonistic to charities, was
a firm dislike of the English doctrine of charitable uses which
had a long and well known history of evils and abuses. Thus,
a Mississippi court even in 1933, while discussing the English
charity doctrine, vehemently remarked: "
Such practices, pernicious in their nature, and dangerous in
their tendency, called for the interference of Parliament, until
all uses charitable within the British statutes, including that of
Elizabeth, were cut off .... The cy pres power, therefore, with
its possibilities for intrigue and injustice, was not only natural-
ly repelled by the constitutional spirit and limitations of popu-
lar government, but was justly feared by the opinion of
patriotic British statesmen who sought relief from the evils of
superstitious uses, in those days of power in the English
sovereign and in the .English bench.
83 2 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 718 (7th ed. 1929). The prerogative cy pres
is applicable only to sustain an illegal gift to charity, or a gift to charity in general
without the interposition of a trustee. Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36, 32 Eng.
Rep. 15 (1803), afj'd, 13 Ves. 416, 33 Eng. Rep. 350 (1807).
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Recognizing the desirability of charitable trusts, American
courts have gradually reversed their earlier attitudes. They
now take the position that charities are favorites of the law
and give them their full support.5 Our courts have run the
gamut from complete rejection of charitable trusts to liberal
support and encouragement. But the increase in charitable
trusts and charitable trust property, has not brought with it
accompanying facilities and provisions for adequate super-
vision. The attorney general of the state is charged with
general supervision over charities. Such an official, however,
does not have sufficient information about charitable funds,
or the personnel and appropriations necessary to perform
this function effectively.86 Neglect and misapplication of
charitable funds has been on the increase, and it has been
estimated that "Billions of dollars of property and millions
of dollars of current income designed for public charity are
being diverted from their rightful beneficiaries." 87
If this estimate is correct, it would seem that we are ap-
proaching a situation that was remedied in England by the
enactment of the Statute of Charitable Uses. Today, the
remedy lies, not in fewer charitable trusts, but in closer
supervision and control.
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